Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK:

Enacting Exclusions, Exemptions, and

Rights by Mullally, Siobhan & Murphy, Cliodhna
????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????
Siobhán Mullally, Clíodhna Murphy




For additional information about this article
                                                     Access provided by Maynooth University (19 Jan 2015 16:46 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hrq/summary/v036/36.2.mullally.html
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: 
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Rights
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AbSTRAcT
Human rights law has begun to address the inequalities and exclusions that 
structure the domain of domestic work. The “everyday” of exclusions from 
employment law and social security, and precarious migration status, had, 
until recently, attracted only limited attention. This article examines the 
reforms introduced in the Overseas Domestic Workers (ODW) visa regime 
in the United Kingdom. The move towards a more precarious migration 
status for migrant domestic workers marks a rejection of the reforms secured 
through sustained political activism. It also highlights the contingency and 
instability of political moments that secure progressive change for migrants, 
and the enduring limits of human rights law. 
I. INTRoDUcTIoN
Domestic work, the provision of caring work in the intimate, domestic sphere, 
is work that continues to be undertaken primarily by women and increasingly 
by migrant women.1 The expected reduction in demand for paid domestic 
workers has not materialized, leading some to ask whether the emergence 
of “global care chains” should be assessed as a major defeat for feminist 
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  1. Helma Lutz, At your Service Madam! The Globalization of Domestic Service, 70 Feminist 
Rev. 89 (2002). See also Maria Galotti, International Migration Program, The Gender 
Dimension of Domestic Work in Western Europe, No. 96 International Migration Papers 
9–13 (2009). 
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movements or as “unfinished business.”2 Combined with the movement of 
women into paid employment, the retreat from welfare state supports in 
Western Europe has produced care economies that are increasingly reliant 
on the outsourcing of intimate, reproductive labor.3 A range of factors has 
contributed to the demand for paid domestic labor, including population 
aging, changing household structures, increasing female participation in 
the labor market, difficulties in reconciling paid employment and caring for 
dependants, and the availability of a flexible, low cost, female, and mainly 
migrant, work force.4 
Human rights law has somewhat belatedly begun to address the in-
equalities and exclusions that structure the domain of domestic work. As 
in other areas of international law, it is primarily the moments of crisis that 
have captured the attention of human rights law. The everyday of workplace 
exploitation, exclusion from the protections of employment law and social 
security, and precarious migration status have attracted less attention to date. 
Recent standard setting initiatives have attempted to address this gap and have 
included the adoption of the landmark 2011 International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers,5 a 
General Recommendation from the UN Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on women migrant work-
ers,6 and a General Comment from the UN Committee on Migrant Workers 
and their Families on migrant domestic workers.7 Against the background 
of this “justice cascade,”8 however, migration laws continue to function as 
limits to the transformative promise of such initiatives. Migration status adds 
yet another axis of discrimination to the intersections of gender, race, and 
class, and contributes further to the constructed vulnerability of domestic 
workers.9 States remain reluctant to recognize the “dissensus” that arises 
between “border norms” and evolving human rights standards.10 
  2. Helma Lutz, Gender in the Migratory Process, 36 J. ethnic & migRation stud. 1647, 1656 
(2010); see also Judy Fudge, Global Care Chains: Transnational Migrant Care Workers, 
28 int’l J. comp. labouR l. & indus. Relations 63 (2012). 
  3. Lutz, supra note 2, at 1654; see generally bRidget andeRson, doing the diRty WoRk? the 
global politics oF domestic labouR (2000). 
  4. For a detailed analysis of global care chains in the context of globalization and North-
South inequalities, see ann steWaRt, gendeR laW and Justice in a global maRket (2011).
  5. Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, (ILO No.189), adopted at 
the 100th session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva (2011) [hereinafter 
Convention Concerning Decent Work].
  6. Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers (5 Dec. 2008), U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (2008) [hereinafter General Rec. No. 26].
  7. Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, General Comment No. 1 on Migrant Domestic Workers (23 Feb. 2011), U.N. 
Doc. CMW/C/GC/1 (2011) [CMW General Comm. No. 1].
  8. This term is borrowed from kathRyn sikkink, the Justice cascade: hoW human Rights pRosecu-
tions aRe changing WoRld politics (2011). 
  9. See Lutz, supra note 2, at 1654; see generally andeRson, supra note 3.
 10. The term “border norms” is borrowed from linda bosniak, the citizen and the alien: dilem-
mas oF contempoRaRy membeRship (2006).
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The UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery has 
identified a “net of dependency factors” that prevent domestic workers 
from leaving situations of exploitation, many of which include constructed 
vulnerabilities linked to migration status.11 The exploitation of migrant do-
mestic workers is often presented by states as the action of an aberrant and 
abusive individual employer. The role migration law plays in creating the 
conditions within which such exploitation occurs, and often goes unchecked, 
is not acknowledged. As Bridget Anderson notes, however, migration law 
not only reinforces the unequal power relations between migrant domestic 
workers and their employers, it also provides unscrupulous employers with 
mechanisms of control they might not otherwise have.12
This article examines the reforms introduced in the Overseas Domestic 
Workers (ODW) visa regime in the United Kingdom and the politics and 
practice of human rights that has surrounded these changes. The move toward 
a more precarious migration status for migrant domestic workers marks a 
rejection of the reforms secured through sustained political activism by do-
mestic workers advocates. It also highlights the contingency and instability 
of political moments that secure progressive change and legal recognition of 
migrant workers’ human rights claims. The reforms to the ODW visa follow 
on from the UK government’s failure to support the 2011 ILO Convention on 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers and its ambiguous commitment to the 
expansion of EU anti-trafficking legislation.13 These steps reflect a resistance 
to the cascade of human rights standards that have sought to overcome the 
limits of migration status as a prerequisite to the exercise of rights.14 
A series of cases before the European Court of Human Rights has 
highlighted the nexus between migration status and heightened risks of 
exploitation,15 as has the work of the CEDAW and Migrant Workers Commit-
tees. Limited access to secure migration status, however, remains the norm 
 11. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Including its Causes 
and Consequences, Gulnara Shahinia, U.N. Doc A/HRC/15/20 ¶ 47 (18 Jan. 2010).
 12. Bridget Anderson, Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of Precarious 
Workers, 24 WoRk, employment & soc’y 300, 312 (2010).
 13. See Statement to the House of Commons from Minister Damien Green (22 Mar. 2011), 
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/parliamentary-business/
written-ministerial-statement/eu-direct-human-trafficking-wms/. The UK Government did 
not initially opt in to the proposed Directive. 
 14. See, e.g., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion on the Juridical 
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants (Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, (17 
Sept. 2003), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18 (2003)). See also the work of the Global 
Forum on Migration and Development: Background Paper, Protecting Migrant Domestic 
Workers: Enhancing their Development Potential (Prepared for Mauritius GFMD 2012, 
available at http://www.gfmd.org/en/docs/mauritius-2012); Checklist to Support and 
Protect Domestic Workers, Mauritius GFMD 2012, available at http://www.gfmd.org/
en/docs/mauritius-2012). 
 15. Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/01, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2005); Rantsev v. Cyprus and Rus-
sia, App. No. 25965/04 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2010); C.N. and V v. France, App. No. 67724/09 
Eur. Ct. H. R. (2012); C.N. v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08 Eur. Ct. H. R. 
(2012).
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for many domestic workers. As the changes in the UK migrant domestic 
workers’ visa regime reveal, states continue to invoke the deportability of 
migrant workers.16 The move by the UK government to introduce a highly 
precarious temporary status for migrant domestic workers and wider policy 
discourse on circular migration marks a resistance to the expansion of hu-
man rights norms to the realm of domestic work and to migrants.17 This 
resistance is accompanied by appeals to protective norms that have shaped 
the law’s engagement with migrant women. The draft Modern Slavery Bill, 
published on 16 December 2013, returns the focus again to the specter of 
trafficking and slavery, yet leaves untouched the precarious migration status 
that exacerbates the potential for exploitative work conditions for domestic 
workers.18 These protective norms do little to expand or support the agency 
of domestic workers and ultimately pose only a limited challenge to the 
continuums of exploitation that define domestic work, particularly for those 
whose migration status is precarious or irregular.19 Against this background, 
the “jurisgenerative” potential of human rights standards, heralded by many, 
continues to be limited.20
II. DEcENT WoRK STANDARDS, ExpANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 
NoRMS: A JUSTIcE cAScADE?
As Joseph Carens has noted, migrant domestic workers are “hard to locate 
on the map of democracy.”21 The movement of migrant domestic workers 
across multiple jurisdictional boundaries, between states as well as from 
the public domain into the private domain of the home, is central to the 
constructed vulnerability of the domestic worker.22 Law plays a dual role 
 16. On the “deportable alien,” see alison kesby, the Right to have Rights: citizenship, humanity, 
and inteRnational laW 111 et seq. (2012).
 17. Catherine Dauvergne & Sarah Marsden, The Ideology of Temporary Labour Migration 
in the Post-Global Era, in citizenship in a globalized WoRld: peRspectives FRom the immigRant 
democRacies (Ayelet Shachar & Geoffrey Brahm Levey eds., 2012).
 18. Home Office, Draft Modern Slavery Bill, Dec. 2013 Cm 8770. See also Joint Committee 
on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill, oral evidence 28 Jan. 2014, available at http://www.
parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/draft-modern-slavery-bill/
written-evidence/. (HC [1019], discussing the implications of the 2012 changes to the 
overseas domestic worker visa regime.)
 19. The concern with international law’s resort to protective norms, particularly in the realm 
of human trafficking is evident in the work of Dianne Otto and others. 
 20. The term “jurisgenerative” is borrowed from Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 
1981 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 haRv. l. Rev. 4, 15 (1982). See also 
selya benhabib, dignity in adveRsity: human Rights in tRoubled times 15 (2011); Dauvergne 
& Marsden, supra note 17, at 56; Fudge, supra note 2, at 63. 
 21. Joseph H. Carens, Live-in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and Others Hard to Locate on 
the map of Democracy, 16 J. pol. phil. 419 (2008). 
 22. Judy Fudge, Global Care Chains, Employment Agencies, and the Conundrum of Jurisdic-
tion: Decent Work for Domestic Workers in Canada, 23 can. J. Women & l. 235 (2011).
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here, jealously guarding the public borders of the state through immigration 
laws while at the same time “reifying the private borders of the home.”23 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has pointed 
out that “the lack of watchdog mechanisms and inadequate monitoring by 
the Government in the country of destination, the recruiting agencies and 
even consulates, mean that migrant domestic workers are cut off and abuses 
remain unseen.”24
For some, the movement to establish decent work standards for domes-
tic work is doomed to failure, given the historical legacy of low status, low 
pay, and exploitation associated with such work. Legal reforms, it is argued, 
cannot fully account for the wider “realm of indignities” experienced by 
domestic workers or the dynamics of power played out on “concrete histo-
ricized bodies” that are gendered, raced, and classed.25 Migrant domestic 
workers are situated in the isolating and devalued “privatized economy of 
household labor,” where highly personalized and emotionally exacting work 
is undertaken in situations that are “heavy with the histories of radicalized 
subordination.”26 Lack of enforcement and application restricts the potential 
for human rights norms to disturb the ongoing reproduction of such histo-
ries.27 Against this background, the expansion of decent work standards to 
domestic work may provide a corrective, as Adelle Blackett has suggested, 
to the “abstract articulations” of rights that traditionally overlook exploita-
tion of domestic workers.28 The refusal on the part of some governments 
and employers to support this expansion of rights, however, continues to 
postpone what is a significant political moment for domestic workers.
 23. Id. at 243, referencing the work of Adelle Blackett, Promoting Domestic Workers: Hu-
man Dignity through Specific Regulation, in domestic seRvice and the FoRmation oF euRopean 
identity: undeRstanding the globalization oF domestic WoRk, 16th–21st centuRies (Antoinette 
Fauve-Chamoux ed., 2005). 
 24. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Commission on 
Human Rights, 60th Sess. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/76 (2004).
 25. Adelle Blackett, Introduction: Regulating Decent Work for Domestic Workers, 23 canadian 
J. Women & l. 1, 43 (2011), citing encaRnación gutieRRez-RodRiguez, migRation, domestic 
WoRk and aFFect: a decolonial appRoach on value and the Feminization oF laboR 6 (2010).
 26. Fiona Williams, Migration and Care: Themes, Concepts and Challenges, 9 soc. pol’y & 
soc’y 385, 386 (2010).
 27. Shireen Ally, On Laws, Rights and Conventions: A Provocation, in Helen Schwenken, 
Elisabeth Prügl et al., Conversations, 13 int’l Feminist J. pol. 437, 457 (2011).
 28. Blackett, Introduction: Regulating Decent Work for Domestic Workers, supra note 25, at 
44, citing Adelle Blackett, Situated Reflections on International Labour Law, Capabilities, 
and Decent Work: The Case of Centre Maraîcher Eugène Guinois, Revue Québécoise de 
dRoit int’l 223, 242 (2007).
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A. The ILo convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers: beyond 
“Noblesse oblige”
This reification (and exclusion) of the household was one of the key issues 
that emerged in debates leading up to the adoption of the ILO Convention on 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Convention). The 2011 Convention is the 
first dedicated international instrument to address the specificity of domestic 
work. As the Report that preceded the Convention notes, it is intended to 
mark a transition from paternalistic conceptions of “good employer[s] acting 
out of a sense of noblesse oblige,” to respect for domestic workers’ rights.29 
The Convention seeks to extend core decent work standards concerning 
fair terms of employment and working conditions to the realm of domestic 
work. States are required to ensure that domestic workers enjoy equality with 
other workers regarding working time,30 entitlements to minimum wage,31 
healthy and safe working conditions,32 and social security protection, includ-
ing maternity.33 It also requires states to introduce measures providing for 
the regulation of employment agencies34 and for effective and accessible 
dispute resolution mechanisms for domestic workers.35 
The only specific provision in the Convention directly relating to migra-
tion is found in Article 8, which provides that national laws or regulations 
specify that written job offers or contracts of employment are provided to 
domestic workers prior to their departure to the country where the work is 
to be performed.36 The conditions under which migrant domestic workers are 
entitled to repatriation following the expiry or termination of their contract of 
employment are also to be specified predeparture.37 This requirement, while 
important, is relatively weak. It requires only that such terms and conditions 
be specified, but does nothing to address the inequalities of bargaining 
power between worker and employer. Article 7 of the Convention adopts a 
similarly minimal approach, requiring that domestic workers be informed 
of the terms and conditions of their work, but without specifying what the 
terms and conditions should be.38 Article 9 requires that domestic workers 
are “free to reach agreement with their employer or potential employer 
on whether to reside in the household.”39 Such freedoms remain illusory, 
 29. International Labour Conference, 99th sess., Report on Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers (Report IV(1)) 13 (2010) [hereinafter ILO Report IV(1)].
 30. Id. art. 10.
 31. Id. art. 11.
 32. Id. art. 13.
 33. Id. art. 14.
 34. Id. art. 15(a).
 35. Id. art. 16.
 36. Convention Concerning Decent Work, supra note 5, art. 8(1).
 37. Id. art. 8(4).
 38. Id. art. 7.
 39. Id. art. 9(a).
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however, where immigration restrictions including access to public funds, 
such as affordable or social housing programs, for migrants are restricted 
and where minimum wage protections are not enforced or applicable. The 
proposed model contract of employment for domestic workers, noted in the 
accompanying Recommendation, seeks to overcome the minimal approach 
taken in the Convention itself.40 Its inclusion in the nonbinding text of the 
Recommendation, however, reflects the reluctance of states to take concrete 
steps to realize the aspirations of a shift from status to contract for domestic 
workers. Even these limited requirements attracted opposition from states, 
however. The UK government argued that it was not, in its view, “the duty 
of a government to ensure that terms and conditions of employment were 
understood by workers.”41
Despite the commitment to addressing disadvantage within the do-
mestic work sector, the Convention’s scope is deliberately limited. The 
specific difficulties facing agency workers, domestic workers in diplomatic 
households, irregular migrant domestic workers, and workers categorized 
as “au pairs” were highlighted repeatedly in the submissions made during 
the drafting process of the Convention.42 These issues remain unresolved as 
the Convention continues to allow for “de-juridifications” that could render 
its expansion of rights meaningless for such workers. Allowing for the pos-
sibility of opting out, of excluding certain categories of domestic workers, 
was a concession to states and to employers’ organizations, many of which 
opposed the proposal to adopt a legally binding instrument.43 The position 
of the European Union during the negotiating process, for example, was to 
support the adoption of a Convention supplemented by a Recommendation, 
but to ensure flexibility in the text of the Convention itself.44 This flexibility is 
found in Article 2 of the Convention, which allows for a sweeping measure 
of disentitlement with respect to “limited categories of workers in respect 
of which special problems of a substantial nature arise.”45 These special 
problems are not specified. A requirement of consultation with employers 
or employees—and where they exist, domestic workers’ organizations—is 
intended to provide a check on the process of opting out. The Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights had specifically expressed concern 
 40. ILO, Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, (ILO Recom-
mendation No. 201) Geneva, 16 June 2011, ¶ 6(3) [hereinafter ILO Recommendation 
201 Concerning Decent Work].
 41. ILO, Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers, Provisional Record No. 15, (ILO 
Conf. 100th sess.), Geneva (June 2011), ¶ 895 [hereinafter, ILO, Report of the Com-
mittee on Domestic Workers, 2011].
 42. RESPECT Network, Introduction and Key Recommendations for an ILO Convention on 
Domestic Work, Amsterdam: Briefing Paper, Recommendations 3–4 (May 2009).
 43. ILO Report IV(1), supra note 29, ¶ 15.
 44. Id. ¶ 2.
 45. Convention Concerning Decent Work, supra note 5, art. 2(2)(b).
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at the wide discretion allowed by Article 2 during the drafting process.46 
Despite its concerns, the provision remained in the final text, however, and 
is a significant concession to the pursuit of greater flexibility, for employers 
and states, in defining the content of rights enjoyed by domestic workers. 
The ILO has specifically acknowledged the need to address a wide 
spectrum of actors, both state and non-state, if the objectives of standard-
setting initiatives such as the Convention and Recommendation are to be 
met. Recruitment agencies are key actors in this process. Article 15 of the 
Convention specifically addresses the role of private recruitment agencies and 
notes measures required to safeguard against abusive practices by such agen-
cies.47 This provision is particularly important for migrant domestic workers. 
The need for cooperation between states to address exploitative practices in 
the context of transnational recruitment is highlighted. However, the require-
ment of an “employment relationship” in Article 1 of the Convention itself 
potentially restricts the application of the Convention to domestic workers 
categorized as self-employed or those who are recruited through private 
agencies. The specific role of intermediaries, such as recruitment agencies 
is widely recognized as a matter of concern given the vagaries of domestic 
employment legislation and its application to agency workers. Although 
Article 15 of the Convention requires members to adopt laws specifying the 
obligations of agencies toward domestic workers, considerable discretion is 
left to determining the scope of such obligations. 
The regulation of employment agencies was one of the more contentious 
issues that arose during the drafting process, with several NGOs, workers’ 
representatives, and governments highlighting the importance of close 
monitoring. The government members of the Africa group, represented by 
South Africa, specifically identified the role of private recruitment agencies 
as a key concern. Human Rights Watch, in its submission, pointed to the 
need to ensure that employment agencies did not charge domestic workers 
for recruitment costs incurred by employers, a practice that frequently leads 
domestic workers to forced labor and servitude.48 The issue of exorbitant fees 
charged by agencies was also highlighted by the Migrant Forum in Asia.49 
Despite recognition of these risks, the Convention itself does little to directly 
address abusive practices by agencies.
The adoption of the Convention and the global momentum that led to 
its enactment as the first binding ILO instrument in more than a decade 
is an important political moment. However, it is one that is marked by an 
 46. ILO: Decent work for Domestic Workers, Report IV(2A), International Labour Confer-
ence, 100th Session, Geneva, 2011 at 21.
 47. Convention Concerning Decent Work, supra note 5, art. 15.
 48. ILO, Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers, 2011, supra note 41, ¶ 49. 
 49. Id. ¶ 50. 
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enactment of limits. The exclusions and exemptions that remain within the 
text of the Convention reflect the continuing reluctance by some members 
to acknowledge the domestic worker as a subject of rights and as more 
than a commodity or ingredient in an economic process. There is also a 
reluctance to acknowledge the imperative to redraw gendered boundaries 
between public and private if international legal standards are to secure a 
movement beyond noblesse oblige. Taking this additional step also requires 
recognizing the intersections of overlapping axes of discrimination―of race, 
gender, and migration status.50 Recognition of these intersections is evident 
in the work of UN human rights treaty bodies, which have somewhat belat-
edly begun to address the sphere of domestic work. This gradual expansion 
of multilateral standards to encompass the realm of domestic work has the 
potential to move beyond the limits of bilateral attempts at reform, where 
the predictable tradeoff between access to jobs and workers’ rights too 
frequently kicks in.51
b. Human Rights at the Intersections: Recognizing the Nexus with 
Migration Status
As Kimberlé Crenshaw has noted, “the intersections of racism and sexism 
. . . cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimen-
sions of those experiences separately.”52 Addressing the intersections of 
both expands the possibilities of human rights law’s potential to address 
discrimination. Migration status, however, is often excluded from the scope 
of race discrimination prohibitions and is frequently ignored in analyses of 
discrimination that adopt a “nationally insular approach.”53 Notably, the 
reluctance to extend nondiscrimination norms to the migration context is 
evident even in the Migrant Workers Convention, which does not include 
migration status in the list of nondiscrimination prohibitions.54 The Migrant 
Workers Convention55 has been described “as a beacon of what has not been 
 50. See written comments submitted by Interights to the European Court of Human Rights 
(pursuant to leave granted by the President of the Chamber in accordance with Rule 
44 § 2 of the Rules of Court) in Kawogo v. UK, App No. 56921/09, Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 18 
(2013).
 51. Labor and Migration in International Law: Challenges of Protection, Specialization and 
Bilateralim, Remarks by Nisha Varia, 105 am. soc’y int’l l. pRoc. 410, 411–12 (2011).
 52. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vio-
lence Against Women of Color, 43 stan. l. Rev. 1241, 1244 (1991).
 53. bosniak, supra note 10, at 144, n.23.
 54. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, adopted 18 Dec. 1990, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th 
Sess., 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1 July 2003).
 55. Id.
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achieved in the realm of rights,”56 both because of its limited ratifications to 
date and the distinctions it makes between the rights of documented and 
undocumented workers. In the practice of UN human rights treaty bodies, 
including the Migrant Workers Committee, however, the significance of 
migration status as relevant to questions of racial and gender discrimination 
is increasingly probed, despite apparent textual exclusions from the treaty 
standards themselves.57
The obligations of effective deterrence that arise from forced labor, 
slavery, and trafficking prohibitions are enshrined in several international 
and regional instruments, including the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),58 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,59 the Palermo Protocol,60 and the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking.61 Developing 
obligations of due diligence at the regional and international levels have 
highlighted the nexus between states’ positive obligations of prevention and 
nondiscrimination norms potentially of significance to migrant domestic 
workers. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly recognized 
that a state’s positive obligations under the Convention go beyond the im-
position of criminal sanctions and include policing and operative measures. 
In Opuz v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights, for the first time in 
Strasbourg caselaw, linked states’ obligations to combat domestic violence 
to the Article 14 nondiscrimination requirements of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR).62 More generally, the gradual expansion of 
indirect discrimination prohibitions suggests possible strategies for such 
challenges.63 The Jessica Lenahan case before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights,64 the Campo Algondero case,65 and others similarly point 
to the nondiscrimination nexus. Given that the majority of domestic work-
 56. Dauvergne & Marsden, supra note 17, at 21.
 57. Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Recom-
mendation No. 30 on Discrimination against Non-Citizens, (10 Jan. 2004).
 58. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 
18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1981).
 59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
into force 23 Mar. 1976).
 60. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2000).
 61. Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 197 (2005).
 62. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H. R., ¶212 (2009).
 63. D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic App. No. 57325/00, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2006).
 64. Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Inter-American Court on Human Rights, 
Judgment, 21 July 2011.
 65. Gonzalez (“Cotton Fields”) v. Mexico, Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Judgment, 
16 Nov. 2009. 
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ers are women and many are migrants, a similar nexus between migration 
law, positive obligations, and nondiscrimination norms arises. The Advisory 
Opinion of the Inter-American Court on the Juridical Condition and the 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants points to the transformative promise that 
underpins human rights standards.66 Fitting into the discrimination paradigm 
is not without its difficulties, however, and is a strategy that brings many 
pitfalls, particularly when required to identify an appropriate comparator67 
or when faced with the possibility not of a legal remedy, but of deportation. 
In its General Comment on Migrant Domestic Workers, the Migrant 
Workers Committee outlines the specific role that immigration law plays 
in the production of vulnerability.68 Overly restrictive immigration laws, it 
notes, lead to higher numbers of migrant domestic workers who are un-
documented or in an irregular situation and thus particularly vulnerable to 
human rights violations.69 Similar vulnerabilities arise where migration laws 
tie a worker’s migration status to the continued sponsorship of a particular 
employer, with the result that domestic workers may risk deportation if they 
leave abusive employment.70 Any such arrangement can “unduly restrict” 
liberty of movement and increase exploitation and abuse, “including in 
conditions of forced labour or servitude.”71 Migration status may also limit 
access to rights such as family reunification. Where visa or work permit 
permissions impose limits on access to public funds, rights to education, 
healthcare, and housing remain illusory.72 The nexus between discrimina-
tion, vulnerability, and migration status is also recognized in the Committee 
for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW 
Committee) General Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers. 
The CEDAW Committee notes that while state parties are entitled to control 
their borders and regulate migration, they must do so “in full compliance” 
with their international obligations. Those obligations include, “the promo-
tion of safe migration procedures and the obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfil the human rights of women throughout the migration cycle.”73 
The CEDAW Committee has also called on states to ensure that visa 
schemes do not indirectly discriminate against women by excluding or lim-
iting options for certain female-dominated occupations, such as domestic 
 66. Advisory Opinion on Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, 
OC-18/03, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR), 17 Sept. 2003.
 67. alice edWaRds, violence against Women undeR inteRnational human Rights laW 141 (2010).
 68. CMW General Comm. No. 1, supra note 7, ¶¶ 21, 22, 27.
 69. Id. ¶ 21.
 70. Id.
 71. Id.
 72. See generally Sarah Spencer & Jason Pobjoy, The Relationship Between Immigration 
Status and Rights in the UK: Exploring the Rationale, Centre on Migration, Society and 
Policy Working Paper No. 86 (University of Oxford, 2011).
 73. General Rec. No. 26, supra note 6, ¶ 3.
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work.74 The changes introduced in the UK Overseas Domestic Worker visa 
regime, however, ignore this call, revealing the continuing willingness of 
states to circumvent human rights standards and resort to what Paul Berman 
has described as “sovereigntist, territorially-based prerogatives.”75 
III. MIGRANT DoMESTIc WoRKERS IN THE UNITED KINGDoM: 
ExcLUSIoNS fRoM RIGHTS
A. Limited Recognition of Domestic Work: A concession
Until 1979, resident domestic workers in the United Kingdom came within 
the scope of the general work permit regime operating under the 1971 
Immigration Act.76 In 1980, when the issuing of work permits for unskilled 
workers ended,77 a limited exception was made for domestic workers who 
had worked for their employers for at least twelve months prior to coming 
to the United Kingdom.78 Given the important reproductive function carried 
out by domestic workers, allowing for such a concession was justified in 
the national interest so as to ensure that productive, highly skilled migrants 
would continue to choose the UK as a preferred destination.79 (Many years 
later, a similar rationale would surface in the caselaw of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union on the free movement rights of EU citizens and their 
third country national spouses.)80 Under the concession scheme, employers 
were permitted to bring domestic workers into the United Kingdom either 
as a visitor or as a “person named to work with a specified employer.”81 A 
degree of confusion surrounding the appropriate immigration status to be 
granted was evident in the varying statuses granted to domestic workers on 
entry.82 In general, however, it was presumed that the employment rights of 
domestic workers and their migration status were linked to their employers, 
increasing the potential for exploitation and abuse despite the recognized 
national interest that their work served.83 
 74. Id. ¶¶ 19, 26(b).
 75. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 southeRn cal. l. Rev. 1155 (2007).
 76. Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry, EEC and Other Commonwealth 
Nationals, Laid before the Houses of Parliament 25 Jan. 1973 (HC 81). For a brief his-
tory of entry to the UK to work and the development of the work permit scheme, see 
gina clayton, textbook on immigRation and asylum laW 343, 376–77 (5th ed., 2012).
 77. clayton, supra note 76, at 376. 
 78. 521 paRl. deb., H.L. (5th ser.)(1990) 1437–8 (U.K.).
 79. 523 paRl. deb., H.L. (5th ser.)(1990) 1052 (U.K.).
 80. Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgment, 11 July 2002, 
C-60/00 [2002] ECR I-6279.
 81. See andeRson, doing the diRty WoRk, supra note 3, at 89.
 82. See Immigration Act 1971, § 3(1)(c). 
 83. bRidget andeRson, bRitain’s secRet slaves (1993). See also andeRson, doing the diRty WoRk, 
supra note 3, at 89. 
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b. Enacting Rights: The oDW Visa
In 1998, the newly elected Labour Government announced a scheme to 
regularize the position of domestic workers who had entered under the 
concession scheme.84 In 2002, the ODW visa scheme was introduced85 
following an extensive advocacy campaign by migrant domestic workers’ 
NGOs, including the Waling-Waling, Kalayaan, and the Commission for Fili-
pino Migrant Workers.86 The ODW visa scheme permitted migrant domestic 
workers to change employers, a key element of the campaign for reform. 
Employment protections were also recognized as applying to domestic work 
and, as with other categories of migrant workers, domestic workers could 
apply to have their dependants join them in the United Kingdom.87 The 
possibility of qualifying for indefinite leave to remain was also recognized, 
subject to meeting generally applicable criteria such as the requirement of 
continuous employment.88 While these hurdles were not insignificant and 
could have posed barriers to secure migration status, a route out of temporary 
residence was at least, in principle, available.89 
However, the ODW visa scheme limited the labor market mobility for 
domestic workers because visa extensions were dependant on securing con-
tinuous employment in the domestic work sector,90 thus limiting possibilities 
for moving out of a traditionally low paid and under-valued employment 
sector. The eligibility criteria also limited the potential impact of the visa 
scheme; only domestic workers employed for one year or more in the houses 
of their employers or in a connected household were eligible to apply. The 
requirement of no recourse to public funds meant that, in practice, many 
domestic workers had no option but to accept live-in arrangements, exacer-
bating the isolated nature of the work and heightening risks of abuse. Thus, 
while the ODW visa provided important employment rights protections, 
it did not fully resolve the precarious status of migrant domestic workers.
In 2006, the Labour Government presented a new “Points Based System” 
of immigration,91 which proposed that domestic workers would receive six-
month non-renewable business visitor visas only and lose the right to change 
 84. See Announcement by Mr. Mike O’Brien M.P. (Immigration Minister) on 23 July 1998. 
HC Deb col 611W (23 July 1998). 
 85. See The Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, 1994, HC 395 of 1994 as amended 
by Cm 5597 of 22 Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Immigration Rules]. 
 86. Waling-Waling was established in 1984 and became a self-organized group with a 
membership of domestic workers. The supporters of the migrant domestic workers formed 
Kalayaan in 1987. The Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW) was founded 
in 1979. Bridget Anderson, Mobilizing Migrants, Making Citizens: Migrant Domestic 
Workers as Political Agents, 33 ethnic & Racial stud. 60 (2010). 
 87. This was not set out in the Immigration Rules but was accepted practice.
 88. Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 159G.
 89. Kalayaan, Annual Report 2009–2010, at 15. See also Kalayaan, Annual Report 2010–2011, 
at 16.
 90. Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 159EA.
 91. See generally home oFFice, a points-based system: making migRation WoRk FoR bRitain (2006).
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employers.92 Following an extensive campaign led by Kalayaan and other 
NGOs,93 the government agreed to postpone the introduction of changes 
to the ODW pending a review of the national anti-trafficking strategy.94 The 
government also affirmed its commitment to minimizing risks of abuse or 
exploitation in any process of reform. In 2009, the House of Commons 
Home Affairs Select Committee in its Report on Human Trafficking in the UK 
concluded that the retention of the existing ODW visa and the protections it 
offered was the single most important issue in preventing forced labor and 
trafficking of domestic workers.95 Given the particular vulnerability of migrant 
domestic workers to abuse, the Home Affairs Select Committee argued that 
the preservation of the ODW regime would be necessary for much longer 
than the proposed two-year period.96 In 2010, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants specifically commended the 
effectiveness of visa protections for migrant domestic workers in the United 
Kingdom and recommended that its protections be extended to cover do-
mestic workers in diplomatic households.97 
c. Reform: Enacting Exclusion
The issue of reform, delayed by the previous Labour Government, came 
to the fore again in 2011. In June 2011, a consultation paper on overseas 
domestic workers published by the Liberal Democratic-Conservative coali-
tion government proposed abolishing the special entry route for domestic 
workers, abolishing the special ODW visa regime or significantly restricting 
its operation to a six-month nonrenewable entry visa, and removing the right 
to change employers (in effect, returning to the earlier Labour Government 
proposals),98 noting that the United Kingdom was “more generous in its 
provision for ODWs than other EU countries.”99 This generosity it seemed 
 92. Id. at 15. 
 93. kalayaan & oxFam, the neW bonded labouR? the impact oF the pRoposed changes to the 
uk immigRation system on migRant domestic WoRkeRs (2008). See also The Housekeeper 
Company (HKC), Campaign Statement of Kalayaan (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.
housekeepercompany.co.uk/kalayaan-campaign-statement-january-2007/. 
 94. UK Border Agency, Government Response to the Consultation on Visitors at 5 (June 
2008).
 95. home aFFaiRs select committee, the tRade in human beings: human tRaFFicking in the uk, 
2008–9, H.C. 23-I, ¶ 59 (U.K.) [hereinafter human tRaFFicking in the uk].
 96. Id.
 97. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, Addendum: Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, 16 Mar. 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/30/Add.3, at 19, Rec. ¶ 76.
 98. Id. at 13. 
 99. uk boRdeR agency, employment-Related settlement, tieR-5 and oveRseas domestic WoRkeRs: a 
consultation 30 (June 2011) [hereinafter consultation papeR].
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was not to be commended. The new government pointed to documented 
abuses as well as levels of unemployment in the UK domestic labor market 
as support for the case to abolish the ODW visa.100 The announcement of 
the proposed reforms coincided with the UK government’s decision to ab-
stain from voting on the ILO Convention, a move that attracted significant 
criticism from domestic workers’ advocates.101 
The stated rationale for the proposed reforms reveals the continuing char-
acterization of domestic work as low-skilled and of little economic value.102 
Migrant domestic workers, the government argued, were “generally doing 
low skilled work.”103 Continuing to allow “unrestricted low skilled entry for 
an extended period” ran counter to the policy of seeking to attract highly 
skilled migrants and limiting access to settlement routes.104 This policy also 
comports with broader trends at the EU level to encourage and facilitate 
preferential immigration routes for “highly qualified workers” and their family 
members.105 The categorization of skill levels in this context is potentially a 
highly gendered exercise. The stated concerns to protect demand-led labor 
migration ignore the continuing demand for domestic workers. The consulta-
tion paper pointed to the existence of the National Referral Mechanism as 
sufficient for identifying victims of trafficking and for responding to abuses 
experienced by domestic workers.106 It did not consider a route to settlement, 
such as that offered by the ODW visa, as an appropriate response to the 
risks of abuse. The consultation paper presented the level of documented 
abuses of migrant domestic workers in itself as a reason to reform the ODW 
visa. This argument seems difficult to sustain given the acknowledged pro-
tections that it offered to migrant domestic workers, including the right to 
change employers.107 
Again, in this debate, we see the reluctance to acknowledge the nexus 
between access to safe migration routes and states’ positive obligations to 
deter and prevent human rights abuses. NGOs strongly resisted the proposed 
reforms and argued that the changes would remove crucial protections from 
migrant domestic workers.108 Central to the debates on the impact of reform 
100. Id.
101. See Rachel Williams, Behind Closed Doors: The Plight of the UK’s Domestic Workers, 
guaRdian online, 15 June 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/the-
womens-blog-with-jane-martinson/2011/jun/15/domestic-workers-uk-obstructive. 
102. consultation papeR, supra note 99, at 31.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id. at 6.
105. The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens 
(2010/C 115/01), ¶ 6.1. 
106. consultation papeR, supra note 99, at 30–31.
107. Id. at 30.
108. Kalayaan Statement, Government Proposes Return to Slavery for Migrant Domestic 
Workers in the UK (2011). See also Kalayaan Response to Consultation: Questions on 
MDWs (5 Aug. 2011).
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proposals is the disputed role that immigration laws and policies play.109 The 
state instrumentalizes the constructed vulnerability of the migrant domestic 
worker to justify the imposition of further immigration restrictions. While 
advocates for the retention of the ODW visa regime highlighted immigra-
tion restrictions as likely to contribute to further abuse and exploitation of 
domestic workers, the government invoked controls on immigration as es-
sential to curbing abuse by unscrupulous employers.110 This argument was 
also made by the government in its response to the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Representative’s Report on her 
2011 country visit.111 
In the House of Commons debates on the proposed reforms, Members 
of Parliament (MP) arguing in favor of retaining the ODW visa emphasized 
the critical role that the right to change employers plays in limiting the po-
tential for exploitation.112 The proposed reforms, it was noted, would lead 
to an increase in abuse and illegality and would “dramatically increase the 
power that the employer has over the worker.”113 Despite these arguments, 
the government continued to refuse to recognize the links between migration 
routes, migration status, and vulnerability to abuse. The issuing of immigrant 
visas, it argued, was “not the way to deal with that.”114 
A series of changes to the Immigration Rules applicable to domestic 
workers came into effect on 6 April 2012.115 Against the trend of expanding 
human rights norms for migrant domestic workers, the reforms introduced 
significantly increase the precariousness of the migrant domestic worker’s 
position. Domestic workers are now permitted to enter and stay in the United 
Kingdom for a maximum period of six months only.116 Critically, the right 
to change employer was removed,117 as was the possibility of sponsoring 
dependants and seeking longer term settlement in the United Kingdom.118 
In introducing these changes, the government signaled its intention to align 
the domestic worker migration route with wider migration policies and to 
return it to its original purpose: “to allow visitors and diplomats to be ac-
companied by their domestic staff—not to provide permanent access to the 
109. See home oFFice, consultation on employment-Related settlement, tieR 5 and oveRseas domestic 
WoRkeRs: (9 June–9 septembeR 2011) summaRy oF the Findings FRom the consultation (2011) 
summaRy oF the Findings FRom the consultation (2012).
110. Anderson, Mobilizing Migrants, supra note 86, at 70–73.
111. Report by OSCE Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in 
Human Beings, following her visit to the UK, 7–10 March 2011, SEC.GAL/200/11, 18 
Jan. 2012, Appendix 1, at 12.
112. 446 paRl. deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 101 (U.K.).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, Presented to Parliament Pursuant to § 3(2) 
of the Immigration Act 1971, HC 1888 (15 Mar. 2012). 
116. Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 159A(iv).
117. Id. ¶ 159E provides: “An extension of stay as a domestic worker in a private household 
may be granted for a period of six months less the period already spent in the UK in 
this capacity.”
118. Id. ¶ 159G(i).
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UK for unskilled workers.”119 Central to the government’s position is the 
view that the domestic worker’s reproductive labor requires limited skills 
and is easily replaced. The intimate connections, relationships, and caring 
skills involved in much of domestic work are denied, as are the wider pro-
tections afforded to other workers. The confinement to a temporary status, 
combined with increasing policy discourse on circular migration, facilitates 
further curbs on family reunification as the domestic worker is denied the 
possibility of claiming family unity rights. 
Migrant domestic workers employed in diplomatic households have not 
enjoyed the right to change employer, even prior to the reforms introduced in 
2012. Their migration status was and continues to be tied to their employment 
directly with a named diplomatic or international civil servant.120 In 2010, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants specifically 
recommended that the UK government consider extending the right to change 
employers to domestic workers in diplomatic households as a safeguard 
against abusive practices.121 In 2011, the OSCE Special Representative and 
Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings included a similar 
recommendation in the report on her visit to the United Kingdom.122 Yet, 
the United Kingdom ignored these recommendations. Instead, the govern-
ment enacted further limits on the rights of domestic workers in diplomatic 
households and removed the route to settlement that had previously been 
available after a five-year residence period.123 
The changes to the ODW regime and the return to a highly temporary 
and tied status for domestic workers has been noted with concern in the 
UK evaluation report of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action 
Against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA).124 In its response, the gov-
ernment argued that the removal of the right to change employer would 
not affect its ability to take other positive measures to combat trafficking.125 
119. Home Office Announcement, Immigration (Employment-Related Settlement, Overseas 
Domestic Workers, Tier 5 of the Points Based System and Visitors), 29 Feb. 2012, at 2 
[hereinafter Announcement].
120. Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 155, which was deleted in 2008 (HC 1113, ¶ 39), 
provided that in order to extend their stay in the UK, such workers had to show that 
they were still engaged in the employment for which the entry clearance was granted. 
121. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, Addendum: Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, supra note 97, ¶ 76(a).
122. Report by OSCE Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in 
Human Beings, following her visit to the UK, 7–10 Mar. 2011, SEC.GAL/200/11, 18 
Jan. 2012, Rec. 5, at 8
123. Announcement, supra note 119, at 2; Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 245ZR(d).
124. See Report Concerning the Implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings by the United Kingdom, GRETA (2012) 6 
(Strasbourg, 12 Sept. 2012), Appendix I: List of GRETA―s Proposals, ¶ 8, at 83.
125. Id. United Kingdom authorities’ Comments on the Report concerning the implementation 
of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by 
the United Kingdom, at 97–98, GRETA(2012)6, Strasbourg, 12 Sept. 2012 ¶ 19. 
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This argument, however, refuses to acknowledge the chilling effect 
that immigration controls can and do play on accessing legal remedies. 
Elsewhere the GRETA report notes both the limited engagement with the 
UK’s National Referral Mechanism on human trafficking and the concerns 
NGOs have expressed that this is, at least in part, due to the absence of 
an immigration firewall and the ever present threat of deportation.126 Given 
the very temporary nature of the immigration routes, it is likely that an 
increasing number of migrant domestic workers will find themselves in an 
irregular situation. As Gregor Noll has noted, in such cases human rights 
law provides little assistance.127 The absence of a firewall between employ-
ment, social security, or other legal remedies and migration laws ensures 
that the disciplinary and punitive reach of immigration controls function as 
limits to the claiming of rights.
D. Domestic Work, the public and the private: Work Like “No other” 
Prior to the final adoption of the 2011 ILO Domestic Work Convention, the 
UK government had signaled its commitment to a “workable convention” 
that could be ratified by as many states as possible and that would protect 
“vulnerable domestic workers worldwide.”128 Despite this commitment, the 
UK government was one of eight states to abstain from the final vote on the 
Domestic Work Convention.129 Ultimately, the government concluded that 
the Convention failed to acknowledge the specificity of domestic work or 
the particular difficulties concerning the application of labor rights in the 
domestic household.130 Speaking in the House of Commons, the Minister 
for Employment Relations commented that the “main sticking point” for 
the government was the potential application of health and safety legisla-
tion to private homes.131 Such a legislative disincentive to employment of 
domestic workers could, he argued, force elderly or disabled individuals 
into residential homes thereby undermining government policy to support 
independent living through direct payments to recipients of care supports.132 
In refusing to support the Convention, the government was concerned 
with protecting its own care and welfare policies, as shielding employers in 
the domestic sphere from what it argued were unnecessary and burdensome 
126. Id. ¶ 231, at 54.
127. Gregor Noll, The Laws of Undocumented Migration, 12 euR. J. migRation & l. 143 (2010).
128. 528 paRl. deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 469W (U.K.).
129. The other states that abstained from the vote were El Salvador, Malaysia, Panama, Sin-
gapore, Thailand, the Czech Republic and Sudan. See 530 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 
(2011) 269 (U.K.).
130. As quoted by Fiona MacTaggart MP, Id. at 269–93.
131. 530 paRl. deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 288–9 (U.K.). 
132. Id.
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regulatory obligations. The shift toward direct cash payments has been a key 
feature of social care policy in the UK over the last decade, facilitating a 
trend toward the outsourcing of care work to private actors including migrant 
women. Direct payments in the social care system are cash payments given 
to service users in lieu of community care services133 and are presented as 
facilitating greater choice and independence in sourcing care supports.134 A 
system of direct payments has been in place since 1996,135 premised on an 
increasing trend towards personalization of care, including through alloca-
tion of personal budgets and direct payments.136 Fiona Williams has argued 
that direct cash payments of this kind have encouraged the development 
of a particular form of care or domestic help: home-based, often low-paid, 
commodified, and generally accessed privately through the market.137 At the 
same time, the trend towards outsourcing of care, she notes, has expanded 
employment opportunities for newly arrived migrant women workers, creating 
yet another link in a wider transnational political economy of care.138 The 
employer-driven nature of the market for care workers, however, contributes 
to the potential for exploitation of migrant domestic workers particularly in a 
context where the usual decent work standards are deemed not to apply.139 
The claimed specificity of domestic work, as work that takes place in 
the household, was also central to the government’s decision not to support 
the Convention. Echoing sentiments expressed in earlier eras in the context 
of debates on domestic violence, the Minister for Employment Relations 
questioned why the government would wish to pass “quite an intrusive 
law,”140 one that would give to health and safety inspectors a “new right to 
visit millions of homes?”141 The evidence of the need for such a change, he 
argued, was weak—households being “low risk in health and safety terms.”142 
The previous government had balked at taking such a measure and had 
continued to uphold the exemptions applicable to domestic households 
133. See Community Care, Services for Carers and Children’s Services, Regs. 7, 8 (Direct 
Payments) (England) Regulations 2009 (No. 1887 of 2009). 
134. dept. oF health, guidance on diRect payments FoR community caRe, seRvices FoR caReRs and 
childRen’s seRvices 8 (2009).
135. Direct payments were introduced in relation to social care services for adults through 
the Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996. This Act was repealed (in relation to 
England) by the Health and Social Care Act 2001. Direct payments are now governed 
by the 2001 Act and the Children Act 1989. 
136. dept. oF health, a vision FoR adult social caRe: capable communities and active citizens 8 
(2010).
137. Fiona Williams, Markets and Migrants in the Care Economy, 47 soundings 22, 25 (2011).
138. Id.
139. loRdes goRdolan & mumtaz lalani, kalayaan Justice FoR migRant domestic WoRkeRs, caRe and 
immigRation: migRant caRe WoRkeRs in pRivate households 39 (2009).
140. 530 paRl. deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (2011) 269–93 (U.K.).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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from the operation of the 1974 Health and Safety Act.143 The increased vul-
nerability of domestic workers, the Minister argued, arose not from health 
and safety concerns but rather from the actions of individual employers that 
were already covered in other legislation.144 
This argument, however, ignores the legislative exemptions relating to 
domestic work that continue to operate in the United Kingdom and that 
provide a protective shield to unscrupulous employers. Domestic workers 
are excluded from certain aspects of the regulation of working time under 
the Working Time Regulations 1998, for example.145 Deductions may be 
made from the minimum wage payment if accommodation is provided,146 
effectively allowing for payments in kind for the live-in domestic worker.147 
Perhaps one of the most striking of these exemptions has been that provided 
by Regulation 2(2) of the National Minimum Wage Regulations, which al-
lows for payments less than the national minimum wage where a domestic 
worker is treated as “a member of the family.”148 
New provisions introduced into the revised Immigration Rules are the 
requirements to provide written terms and conditions of employment as part of 
the pre-entry application process and to commit to complying with the terms 
of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and supporting regulations.149 The 
strengthening of pre-entry protections is a feature of the Convention, which 
the government refused to support.150 Given this refusal, it is unclear how 
effective pre-entry clearance measures will be in practice or whether there 
143. See Health and Safety Act 1974, § 51.
144. Id. § 3.
145. Regulation 19, Working Time Regulations 1998 (No. 1833 of 1998), which provides that 
Regulations 4(1), (2), 6(1), (2), (7), 7(1), (2), (6), 8 do not apply in relation to a worker 
employed as a domestic worker in a private household. These Regulations cover the 
maximum weekly working time, length of night work, health assessment and transfer 
of night workers to day work, and weekly rest period.
146. Minimum Wage Regulations 1999, Regs. 36, 37 (No. 584 of 1999).
147. Report on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Report IV(1)), supra note 29, at 7.
148. Minimum Wage Regulations, supra note 146, Reg. 2(2) provides that “work” for the 
purposes of the Regulations does not include work relating to the employer’s household 
done by a worker where: 
the worker resides in the family home of the employer for whom he works; 
that the worker is not a member of that family, but is treated as such, in particular as 
regards to the provision of accommodation and meals and the sharing of tasks and 
leisure activities; 
that the worker is neither liable to any deduction, nor to make any payment to the 
employer, or any other person, in respect of the provision of the living accommoda-
tion or meals; and 
that, had the work been done by a member of the employer’s family, it would not be 
treated as being performed under a worker’s contract or as being work because the 
conditions in sub-paragraph (b) would be satisfied.
149. Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 159A(v).
150. ILO, Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers, 2011, supra note 41, ¶ 895.
2014 Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK 417
is any political will to monitor their impact on the prevention of abuse. A 
previous report of the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee 
on Human Trafficking expressed skepticism as to the effectiveness of pre-
departure interviews with domestic workers in preventing abuse, noting that 
“enforcement was patchy at best.”151 The family member exemption from 
the operation of the minimum wage requirements continues to apply, how-
ever.152 And, as was noted by domestic workers’ advocates, access to UK 
employment protections or remedies for failure to comply with minimum 
wage requirements is greatly limited by the temporary and tied nature of 
the new visa arrangements.153
The family member exemption, perhaps more than any other, reinforces 
the public private divide that limits the enforcement of decent work standards 
for domestic workers.154 It is a line that is, of course, deeply gendered and 
reflects continuing categorization of domestic work as work like no other. 
E. Just Like one of the family: Enacting Exclusions
A series of cases before the UK Employment Appeals Tribunal highlights 
the difficulties that arise when the family member exemption is applied.155 
Where the work done could be described as similar to the everyday work 
that characterizes intimate domestic life, it was removed from the scope of 
employment law protections reserved for the public domain. In Ms. Julio 
v. Ms. Jose, the Tribunal accepted Ms. Julio’s argument that she was not at 
any time paid the agreed monthly salary,156 but found that she was treated 
as “a member of the family, in particular as regards to the provision of ac-
commodation of meals and the sharing of tasks and leisure activities.”157 
The family member exemption from the minimum wage regulations was 
therefore applicable. In the case of Ms. Nambalat v. Mr. Taher and Mrs. 
Tayeb, the Tribunal found that there were distinct phases in the employment 
relationship, during which Nambalat’s work duties varied widely. Despite 
these variations, the Tribunal concluded that the family member exemption 
nonetheless applied.158 In the case of Ms. Udin v. Mr. and Mrs. Chamsi-Pasha, 
151. human tRaFFicking in the uk, supra note 95, ¶¶ 116–18, ¶55.
152. UK Border Agency, Entry Clearance Guidance, WRK2.1.9, available at http://www.ukba.
homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/ecg/wrk2/wrk2-1/#header9.
153. Melanie Gower, Immigration: Migrant Domestic Workers (20 Mar. 2012), available 
at http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN04786/
immigration-migrant-domestic-workers.
154. mumtaz lalani, kalayaan/lalani, ending the abuse: policies that WoRk to pRotect migRant 
WoRkeRs 22 (2011). 
155. Appeal No. UKEAT/0553/10/DM, Judgment of 8 Dec. 2011 (EAT Judgment).
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the tribunal found that variations in the working and living conditions of 
the claimant changed the nature of the employment relationship. Financial 
difficulties encountered by the employers had led to a downsizing of ac-
commodation space and more difficult living conditions for Ms. Udin for 
limited periods. For these periods only, the Tribunal concluded that the family 
member exemption did not apply, and Ms. Udin was therefore entitled to a 
remedy for the unauthorized deductions from her wages during this time.159 
On appeal, each of the claimants argued that the Employment Tribu-
nal had erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the family member 
exemption.160 The narrowest possible interpretation, it was argued, should 
be given to this exemption so as to ensure consistency with the statutory 
language and compliance with the public policy of eliminating gender and 
racial discrimination, given that the majority of domestic workers were 
women from minority ethnic communities.161 It was also argued that a narrow 
interpretation was necessary to meet the state’s positive obligations under 
Article 4 ECHR, in line with the judgment of European Court of Human 
Rights in Siliadin v. France.162 The Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) did 
not specifically comment on the Article 4 ECHR arguments, but did accept 
that a narrow interpretation must be given to the family member exemp-
tion.163 The dignity with which the domestic worker is treated, the degree of 
privacy and autonomy afforded, and the extent to which exploitation occurs 
were also relevant factors.164 The core question was whether the worker is 
“integrated into the family.”165 If the answer is yes, then the limits of human 
rights protections appear to be reached. In each of the three cases before 
it, the Employment Appeals Tribunal concluded that the family member 
exemption applied and the domestic workers, all of whom were migrants, 
were not entitled to payment of the national minimum wage.166 
Integration into the family can trigger an exemption from a core labor 
standard, which reveals a continuing reluctance, as the European Court of 
Human Rights has noted elsewhere, to apply human rights norms “within 
personal relationships or closed circuits.”167 Until recently, the UK Border 
Agency’s Instructions to entry clearance officers noted that non-payment of 
159. Id.
160. Id. ¶ 39.
161. Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.
162. (2006) 43 EHRR 16. EAT Judgment, supra note 155, ¶ 41.
163. Id. ¶ 46.
164. Id.
165. Id. ¶ 45.
166. Id. ¶ 58. In relation to Ms. Udin, the EAT over-turned the majority finding of the Em-
ployment Tribunal, concluding that in the overall context of the family’s circumstances, 
the changing conditions did not result in Ms. Udin ceasing to be treated as a member 
of the family. Id. ¶ 57.
167. Opuz, supra note 62, ¶ 132.
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the national minimum wage was not a valid reason for a refusal to issue an 
ODW visa. The House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee in its 
Report on Human Trafficking in the UK criticized this practice, comment-
ing that it “makes a mockery of the concept of a legal minimum wage.”168 
Changes to the Immigration Rules introduced in April 2012 only partly ad-
dress this criticism. Applicants for an ODW visa now have to demonstrate 
that the employer has agreed to pay the minimum wage in accordance with 
the National Minimum Wage Regulations.169 However, the family member 
exemption continues to apply, giving legal standing to the paradox inherent in 
many domestic work employment relationships. Employers delegate intimate 
reproductive labor to domestic workers, expecting unconditional availability 
and care while remaining unwilling to comply with decent work standards.
IV. LITIGATING ARTIcLE 4 of THE EURopEAN coNVENTIoN oN 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 introduced into the domestic law of 
the United Kingdom the offense of holding another person in slavery or 
servitude or requiring them to perform forced or compulsory labor.170 This 
law sought to remedy the legislative gap that arose in cases where traffick-
ing had not occurred or the trafficking element could not be proven to a 
criminal standard.171 A series of cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights highlights the inadequacies of the legal framework in place prior to 
the adoption of the Coroners and Justice Act and the challenges of enforce-
ment of forced labor, servitude, and slavery prohibitions, particularly in a 
migration context. These cases build on the Court’s evolving jurisprudence 
under Article 4, following the landmark Siliadin judgment. 
In Siliadin, the Court recognized for the first time that Article 4 could 
give rise to positive obligations for states, including the obligation to ensure 
that effective criminal sanctions were in place and enforced at the domestic 
level.172 A key question that had arisen in the domestic legal proceedings was 
how to demarcate the boundaries of everyday intimate labor in the domestic 
sphere from working conditions that violate Article 4. The French Civil Court 
of Appeal in concluding that exploitation had taken place, was anxious to 
168. human tRaFFicking in the uk, supra note 95, ¶ 53.
169. Immigration Rules, supra note 85, ¶ 159A(v).
170. Coroners and Justice Act 2009, § 71.
171. Crown Prosecution Service, Slavery, Servitude and Forced or Compulsory Labour (2009), 
available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/slavery_servitude_and_forced_or_com-
pulsory_labour/.
172. (2006) 43 EHRR 16. EAT Judgment, supra note 155, ¶ 41.
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clarify that Siliadin was not a member of the family and was not treated as 
such.173 The public tests of rights compliance could, therefore, kick in. In 
contrast, the Court found that Siliadin had not been subjected to working 
conditions that were incompatible with human dignity. The Court noted that 
these conditions were “the lot of many mothers.”174 The Court’s presumption 
that the usual standards of human dignity could not apply, therefore, served 
to distinguish domestic work as “work like no other.” 
These distinctions came into play again in the subsequent case of Osman 
v. Denmark,175 where the European Court of Human Rights was required 
to distinguish between domestic care work provided by a minor in a fam-
ily context and human trafficking. Osman, a Somali national, had lived in 
Denmark from the age of seven. At the age of fifteen, her father brought 
her to northern Kenya and left her at the Hagdera refugee camp to care for 
her paternal grandmother. After two years, she left the camp and applied to 
be reunited with her family in Denmark. The Court found that the Danish 
authorities’ refusal to reinstate her residence status constituted an unjustifi-
able interference with her rights to privacy and to family life.176 
The AIRE center, representing the applicant, had argued that Osman had 
been subject to intra-familial human trafficking and that the State had failed 
in its obligation to investigate and prosecute the offense of trafficking.177 The 
Court rejected this argument, however, noting that neither the applicant 
nor her mother had complained of trafficking to the Danish authorities. 
This conclusion ignores the positive obligation on states to identify victims 
of trafficking, which is recognized as a core obligation under the Council 
of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking and an element of the 
positive obligations of prevention and deterrence implied by Article 4 of 
the ECHR, at least since Rantsev.178 In its judgment, the Court distinguished 
the work done as part of everyday family life, from the exploitation that 
constitutes an element of human trafficking offenses.179 Its conclusions, 
however, failed to acknowledge the role played by gender in determining 
the kind of work or harm that might be defined as exploitative or as merely 
a family role. Nor does it address the wider issue of cultural expectations 
concerning appropriate family roles and responsibilities or the intersections 
of gender, race, and age as overlapping axes of potential discrimination and 
disadvantage.180 
173. See generally Van Walsum, Labour, Legality and Shifts in the Public/Private Divide, 
(Paper presented at Seminar on Gender, Migration and Human Rights, EUI Florence, 
18–20 June 2012) at 9 (copy on file with the authors).
174. Siliadin, supra note 15, ¶ 44.
175. Osman v. Denmark, App. No. 38058/09, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2011).
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178. Rantsev, supra note 15.
179. Osman, supra note 175, ¶ 64.
180. See generally Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic, Sent Away: The 
Trafficking of Young Girls and Women Within the Family Unit (May 2010).
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The issue of intra-familial trafficking has also come before the Court in 
the cases of C.N. and V v. France181 and in C.N. v. UK. The case of C.N. 
and V concerned the treatment of two sisters aged sixteen and ten years old, 
originally from Burundi, who were living with their aunt and uncle in Paris 
following the death of their parents in Burundi’s bloody civil war. Both sisters 
were required to undertake extensive domestic work and C.N., the older 
sister, was also required to undertake care work for the disabled son of her 
relatives. Reflecting again the continuum of exploitation that is frequently 
found in domestic work, the Court noted that it was necessary to distinguish 
“forced or compulsory labor” from work that could “reasonably be required 
in respect of mutual family assistance or cohabitation, taking into account, 
among other things, the nature and amount of work in issue.”182 The Court 
noted that C.N. had to perform, under threat of being returned to Burundi, 
activities that would have been described as work if performed by a remu-
nerated professional. Regarding her treatment, the Court concluded that 
France had failed to meet its positive obligation to put in place an effective 
legislative and administrative framework to combat servitude and forced or 
compulsory labor. V, the younger sister, had attended school, developing 
social networks that were ultimately central to the Court’s finding that no 
violation had occurred with respect to her situation.183 This finding was ar-
rived at despite the aunt having been convicted by a domestic court for ag-
gravated assault of V.184 The Court’s finding suggests a failure to acknowledge 
the relative youth of V as a key issue in assessing the reasonableness of the 
demands made of her and the likely impact of coercive threats.
The absence of an effective legislative and administrative framework to 
meet the state’s positive obligations under Article 4 of the ECHR has arisen 
under a series of cases in the United Kingdom. These cases also highlight 
the difficulties of establishing credibility and demonstrating the significance 
of the harm endured by migrant domestic workers. The case of C.N. v. 
United Kingdom185 involved a Ugandan applicant who had come to the 
United Kingdom with the assistance of a relative to escape alleged physical 
and sexual violence. On arrival, her passport was taken from her by her 
relative and not returned.186 She later began work as a live-in caregiver for 
an elderly couple, having been introduced to a private recruitment agency. 
C.N. claimed not to have received any of the remuneration paid to the 
agent.187 She left her live-in caregiver position after several years, having 
181. C.N. and V. v. France, supra note 15, ¶¶ 90–93. 
182. Id. ¶ 74.
183. Id. ¶ 93.
184. The diplomatic immunity enjoyed by Mr. M., a former Burundi government minister 
and a UNESCO employee, was waived by UNESCO, as was that of his wife. See id. 
¶¶ 22, 23.
185. C.N. v. U.K., supra note 15.
186. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
187. Id. ¶¶ 10, 48.
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fallen ill, and sought asylum. She was denied asylum in part because of a 
finding of a lack of credibility.188 A complaint was submitted to the police 
concerning her treatment by her employers, but it was found that there was 
insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegation of trafficking, though it 
was accepted that there was dispute over payment of wages and that her 
relative had “kept more than he should have done.”189 Further requests from 
C.N.’s solicitor to consider prosecutions for jus cogens offenses of slavery 
or forced labor were rejected.190
Of note are comments made by the police authorities that the situation 
was one where, “one criminal (her uncle) has taken all the proceeds of their 
crime.”191 The reference to their crime reveals a preoccupation with the 
irregularity of C.N.’s employment. Elsewhere, the police noted that C.N.’s 
identity and travel documents were false, suggesting again that the illegality 
of the applicant’s entry to and presence in the United Kingdom somehow 
weakened her claims.192 As C.N. argued before the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, the suggestion that the lack of payment was no more than an 
absence of “honor among thieves betrayed a fundamental disregard of the 
ILO’s key indicators of forced labor and a troubling ignorance of the vulner-
abilities of illegal immigrants.”193 In correspondence with C.N.’s solicitor the 
police commented that they were not aware of any specific offense of forced 
labor or servitude in UK law, though they noted that “regulation of working 
conditions are controlled by such areas as health and safety legislation.”194 
There is no acknowledgment and perhaps not even awareness on their part 
that the usual protections of health and safety law so confidently invoked 
here do not apply to domestic workers. 
The Court found the United Kingdom to have violated Article 4 of the 
ECHR.195 The Court’s judgment on the meaning of servitude is an important 
one. It recognizes domestic servitude as a specific offense distinct from 
trafficking and exploitation, “which involves a complex set of dynamics, 
involving both overt and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compli-
ance.”196 Due to the absence of a specific offense in domestic law, the Court 
found that the authorities were unable to give sufficient weight to these fac-
tors and to meet their obligation to carry out an effective investigation into 
C.N.’s complaints.197 Drawing on Ranstev, the Court noted that a duty to 
188. Id. ¶ 14.
189. Id. ¶¶ 15–18.
190. Id. ¶¶ 21–24.
191. Id. ¶ 25.
192. Id. ¶ 26.
193. Id. ¶ 49.
194. Id. ¶ 30.
195. The applicant had also alleged violations of Article 8 and Article 13 (read in conjunction 
with Articles 4 and 8). The Court found that no separate issues arose under Articles 8 
and 13, given its findings on Article 4. Id.
196. Id. ¶ 80.
197. Id. ¶¶ 80–81.
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investigate was triggered wherever a credible suspicion arose that rights had 
been violated. In this case, the Court was particularly critical of the police 
authorities’ failure to interview key actors, notably C.N.’s relative and the 
private recruitment agent. What was required under Article 4, they said, was 
a thorough investigation premised on an understanding of “the many subtle 
ways an individual can fall under the control of another.”198 The Court was 
also critical of the failure to give any weight to C.N.’s complaints that her 
passport was taken from her, that her wages were withheld, and that she 
was frequently threatened with reporting to the immigration authorities. All 
of these were factors, as the Court noted, that came within the scope of the 
ILO’s indicators of forced labor.199 
The duty of effective investigation also arose in the case of O.O.O. and 
Others v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.200 In this case, four 
Nigerian women complained that they had been brought to the United 
Kingdom as children and forced to undertake extensive domestic work, 
including childcare. Each of the women complained that they had been 
regularly subjected to physical and emotional abuse. Although they sought 
protection and assistance from the police, their complaints were not pursued. 
The High Court accepted that the four claimants, who had alleged treatment 
contrary to Articles 3 and 4 of the ECHR on the part of their employers, 
were concerned about their migration status in the United Kingdom and 
that this concern had impacted their willingness to cooperate with a police 
investigation. The Court found, however, that reasonable sensitivity on the 
part of the police authorities could have overcome this obstacle.201 A duty of 
effective investigation arose on the part of the police, they said, whenever a 
credible allegation was received, “however that information comes to their 
attention.”202 The duty of effective investigation arising under Articles 3 and 
4 of the ECHR, the Court concluded, had not been met in this case. 
V. coNcLUDING REMARKS
For irregular or temporary migrants, the recognition of a positive duty to 
investigate is critical. The difficulty, however, is that investigation and the 
claiming of rights may lead, not to the possibility of remaining in the coun-
try, but to deportation. For those who are identified as victims of trafficking, 
rights to remain may be triggered.203 Outside of the trafficking framework, 
198. Id. ¶ 80.
199. Id.
200. O.O.O & Others v. Metropolitan Police [2011] EWHC 1246 (QB).
201. Id. ¶¶ 170–77.
202. Id. ¶163.
203. See generally GRETA Evaluation Report, supra note 124, ¶ 220, at 51, (discussing 
difficulties relating to the standard of proof applied to the identification of victims of 
trafficking and consequences for eligibility for residence permits).
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however, deportability remains a constant limit to rights. That migrant 
domestic workers continue to invoke rights through a process of making 
claims before the European Court of Human Rights reveals the continuing 
resonance and force of these claims. States, employers, and others continue 
to resist such claims, however, and, in particular, refuse to acknowledge the 
nexus between denials of rights and migration status. Claiming rights through 
human rights litigation in domestic and international courts can lead to the 
creation of “contact zones” in which an “alternative legality” is presented, 
drawing on the transformative promise of human rights norms.204 The claims 
presented reveal the potential to position domestic work firmly within the 
world of work and highlight the injustice of failing to apply generally appli-
cable workplace and human rights norms. The obstacles to presenting such 
cases and claims are many. However, they are particularly steep for migrant 
domestic workers whose status may be tied to that of their employer or their 
presence within the territory of the state dependant on the goodwill of an 
unscrupulous employer, or whose presence might be irregular or illegal. The 
isolated and privatized nature of domestic work also limits the emergence 
of contact zones within which alternative legalities may be presented. 
Given the high levels of irregularity and undeclared work in the domestic 
work sector, a key issue at the intersections of migration, gender, and race 
is the application and enforcement of employment protections to migrant 
domestic workers in irregular situations. In the United Kingdom, the gener-
ally applicable employment protections do not apply, especially where the 
worker is deemed to have participated voluntarily and taken an active part 
in the illegal conduct.205 In Hounga v. Allen,206 the Court of Appeal held that 
the applicant, a Nigerian citizen employed in the United Kingdom as an au 
pair, could not bring a racial discrimination claim against her employers as 
she was knowingly working unlawfully. Although the Court accepted that 
she had suffered ill-treatment, including physical abuse in the course of her 
employment,207 it found that she was precluded from bringing forward a claim 
that was, “clearly connected or inextricably bound up or linked with her 
own illegal conduct.”208 The case has been criticized, however, as the right 
to nondiscrimination is not dependent in UK law on the existence of a valid 
employment contract. At the time of writing, an appeal is pending before 
the UK Supreme Court. More generally, of course, the protections human 
rights treaties—including the ECHR—afford do not admit of such sweeping 
exclusions. In practice, however, courts continue to be preoccupied with 
the migration status of the complainant.
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In Siliadin, the European Court of Human Rights recognized states’ posi-
tive obligations in the context of Article 4. It failed, however, to recognize 
that such obligations could extend to regularization of a victim’s migration 
status and to positive obligations of rehabilitation.209 The nexus between 
migration routes and states’ positive obligations of prevention and protection 
were given more consideration in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,210 a case 
involving trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Specifically, the 
Court found that Article 4 requires states to put in place adequate measures 
to regulate businesses used as a cover for human trafficking, and to ensure 
that domestic legislation provides “practical and effective protection of the 
rights of victims and potential victims of trafficking.”211 The Court found that 
the Cypriot government had violated Article 4 by not regulating the “cabaret 
artiste” industry and by maintaining a visa regime for cabaret artistes that 
did not provide effective protection against trafficking.212 On this reading, 
destination states may be found in breach of their Convention obligations 
by continuing to operate immigration schemes that put migrant domestic 
workers at risk of treatment contrary to Article 4.213 
The links between limited opportunities for legal migration for domestic 
workers and the high level of irregularity in the sector have been empha-
sized by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, amongst others.214 Irregularity, 
as they note, leads to high levels of insecurity, producing susceptibility to 
exploitation and difficulties in accessing rights protections.215 In response to 
concerns of abuse and exploitation of migrant domestic workers, however, it 
is open to states to respond by expanding immigration controls rather than 
seeking to remedy the disadvantages that continue to attach to precarious 
migration status. As Catherine Dauvergne notes, “Once an argument is 
shifted to the terrain of rights, the right of the nation to shut its borders tends 
209. See Holly Cullen, Siliadin v. France: Positive Obligations Under Article 4 of the European 
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to overshadow the rights claims of individuals.”216 The deportability of the 
alien persists as a constant threat to the claiming and enjoyment of rights.
The recent changes introduced in the ODW visa regime in the United 
Kingdom reveal the continuing willingness of states to limit migration op-
tions for domestic workers. Against the background of such resistance from 
states, the potential for human rights law to provide an effective bulwark 
against exclusion in the migration context must be questioned. Borders and 
limits proliferate the texts of human rights law, and as Boaventura De Sousa 
Santos argues, exclusion rather than exploitation has become the central 
mechanism of disentitlement from law’s protections. His comment appears 
particularly relevant to migrant domestic workers. Exclusions and exemptions 
that operate in employment laws, in laws and policies on access to social 
security, in immigration and citizenship laws, and in the scope of diplomatic 
immunity protections reinforce the invisibility and vulnerability of domes-
tic workers. These exclusions take the form and shape of de-juridifications 
that limit the application of human rights norms to domestic work and to 
migration status.217 
Assessing the process of legal reform in the United Kingdom, it might 
be argued that the position from 1998 to 2012 was an anomaly of sorts, 
the product of a short-lived political moment and a powerful advocacy 
campaign that successfully enacted domestic workers’ rights.218 The ODW 
visa, though imperfect, provided a better “place in the world”219 for migrant 
domestic workers—a route to settlement and the possibility of changing 
employers and of sponsoring family dependants. The reforms introduced 
by the UK government have removed these possibilities, returning migrant 
domestic workers again to a deeply unequal employment relationship and 
a precarious migration status. Is the status of the migrant domestic worker 
diminished then, to that of bare life? As yet, it is unclear whether human 
rights law can effectively resist such processes of exclusion or whether the 
deployment of law continuously reproduces “categories of illegal at its 
boundaries,”220 limiting the transformative promise of human rights norms. 
Human rights law, if recognizing the nexus between migration status, 
access to safe migration routes, and the enjoyment of rights, has the potential 
to be transformative. States continue to resist this potential, however. The 
process of enacting rights in courts and through political activism is a difficult 
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and uncertain one, but one that can be empowering.221 Reforms secured 
are contingent and reversible, as the story of the ODW visa reveals. In the 
context of migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom, the shutting 
down of a migration pathway reflects the potential for coercive exercises of 
state power that reverse reforms secured through sustained political activ-
ism. Such reversals, however, may yet be challenged, at which point the 
inescapable nexus between the state’s migration laws, migration status and 
human rights violations cannot be denied.
221. On the transformative potential of rights and their limits, see benhabib, supra note 20, at 
130. 
